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prospect of a virtual
ethics
Much of the research on computer-mediated-
communication (CMC) identifies various forms
of disinhibition associated with the engage-
ment with another through the medium of
computerized communications technology. Yet
disinhibition should not be taken to exclude
the possibility of conceiving of a framework
for an ethical engagement with the Other in
CMC practice. Using the idea of the ‘face’ as it
is developed in the work of Levinas, I believe it
is possible to augment the idea of the seem-
ingly boundless freedom opened out by new
technologies with the notion of the responsi-
ble or ethical user. To do this, I will suggest
that a phenomenology of the user interface is
necessary as a first stage in enabling CMC
studies to work through the conceptual
distinction on which these studies apparently
hinge, that is, a distinction between CMC and
face-to-face (FTF) communication. At the core
of this phenomenology, I will examine a
conceptual apparatus constructed around the
notion of a ‘face-interface’, understood as a
dual facet of the engagement with an Other
both of and through the figure of the
computer, experienced as an extension of the
body and the voice of both user and interlocu-
tor.
Keywords: phenomenology, Levinas, computer-
mediated communication (CMC), ethics, disin-
hibition, alterity, other, face, interface
My purpose here is to make some initial inves-
tigations into the possibility of using a
Levinasian ethical framework – in particular,
the slippery concept of ‘face’ – within an ethics
of computer mediated communication (CMC).
This paper will, by necessity, pull up short of
developing such an approach more fully. It
seeks instead to lay some groundwork from
which such a framework might be later devel-
oped. This is to say that before we stumble
toward pursuing applications of Levinas’s
ethics in the CMC environment, we need to be
very clear about the potential for conceptual
slippages and contradictions, and to set up a
conceptual model according to which such
mishaps can be avoided. 
My initial task will be to establish the most
evident obstacles to the use of Levinas in stud-
ies of CMC, and I will then outline in rudimen-
tary fashion the first steps that must be taken
in order to overcome these obstacles. The need
for just such an ethical approach may never
have been more evident than now. In the last
few years, in the United States, United
Kingdom, and elsewhere, a number of lawsuits
have been filed relating to abusive or offensive
material in posts to Internet discussion forums
or message boards. The onset of litigation is, I
believe, an inevitable outcome of the relative
lack of regulation exerted by legislators over
the worldwide web. The speed with which the
dominion of the Internet mutated from a small
clique of fairly self-regulated hackers to some-
thing far more global, and more amorphous,
has been dizzying, and it is little wonder that
legislators who cut their teeth on simple issues
like local content in broadcast media have been
unable to keep up with its progress.
Can freedom be commensurate with responsi-
bility?
The flipside of this is that proponents of
Internet technology decry the prospect of regu-
latory control with suggestions that the web
has evolved in its chaotic manner according to
a libertarian ethos – or, at least, a mythos – of
individual freedoms: free speech; free enter-
prise; free access; free sampling; in short, free
agency. Yet can such freedoms be also
commensurate with the idea of a responsible
subject? The history of the Internet is dotted
with flashpoints at which the freedoms
enjoyed by many users at one time and on one
site translates into a free-for-all. The onset of
litigation arises as a result of this situation in
which many pockets of the web want conspicu-
ously to inure themselves against seemingly
anti-social communicative practices such as
spamming, flaming, or trolling. 
Yet it may be the case that anti-social commu-
nicative practices are par for the course on the
Internet, since social researchers of CMC
suggest that on-line interlocutors invariably
seem sufficiently protected by the anonymity
of the web to indulge in ‘disinhibition’, in
which the interlocutor loses any sense of the
interaction as being imbued with a social
status, thus leading to a diminished sense of
responsibility toward other participants. These
researchers also show that disinhibition tends
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to function normatively in on-line communica-
tion: the language of CMC is by and large
stripped bare of phatic markers, creating a
greater degree of self-orientation in the
communicative act, whether this takes the
form of excessive self-disclosure or anonymous
flaming.
The principle of disinhibition might, of course,
seem to be a significant obstacle for an ethical
framework. Disinhibition appears to be, from
the standpoint of the individual user, linked to
increasing freedom, yet we have seen that it
also leads to diminished responsibility. Yet for
Levinas, freedom is born of responsibility;
indeed, it hinges inexorably upon the establish-
ment of a responsibility toward the Other. As
Zygmunt Bauman explains in an eloquent para-
phrasing of Levinas from Otherwise than
Being, or Beyond Essence (1993: 86): ‘I am I who
is responsible, he is he to whom I assign the
right to make me responsible. It is in this first
creation of meaning of the Other, and thus also
of myself, that my freedom, my ethical free-
dom, comes to be.’ In other words, I am respon-
sible first, and from this responsibility comes
my freedom. 
Thus, we seem to be already at something of
an impasse: disinhibition presents itself as a
normative function of Internet practice, yet this
normative function fundamentally reverses the
ethical relation we seek to instantiate. How can
the two be reconciled? More to the point,
initially, is a Levinasian approach to CMC a
viable goal? Levinas may in fact strike us a most
unlikely candidate for the originator of an
ethics of CMC. The man’s own lack of ease with
electronic modes of communication is well
documented. In his oration at Levinas’s funeral,
Jacques Derrida recalled the anxiety Levinas
expressed at the fear of being cut off in the
middle of the communicative act: 
I cannot speak of the interruption without
recalling, like many among you no doubt, the
anxiety of interruption that I could feel in
Emmanuel Levinas when, on the telephone
for example, he seemed at each moment to
fear being cut off, to fear the silence or
disappearance, the ‘without-response,’ of the
other whom he tried to call out to and hold
on to with an ‘allo, allo’ between each
sentence, and sometimes even in midsen-
tence (1996: 7).
We can only imagine how anxious Levinas
might have been if faced with an on-line
communication environment such as the
Messenger system: the lack of voice, delays
while the interlocutor types a reply, and worst
of all, the fear that at any moment the status
of the interlocutor may change to offline.
Levinas’s anxiety suggests that in his own
personal constitution there lay a deep depend-
ence on the visible presence of the other
person, a reliance on non-verbal cues, eye
contact, and such like. We may even find it
tempting to investigate the possibility that the
emphasis on such key concepts as ‘face’ and
‘proximity’ – which Bauman is in fact explain-
ing in the quotation that I have used earlier –
are so important in Levinas’s theoretical model
because of a deep-seated fear of a lack of inti-
macy within the theorist’s own psychological
make-up.
Yet I will leave that discussion aside for now.
Here, it will suffice for us to note that such an
observation – that Levinas seems to have
possessed a psychological aversion to any elec-
tronic mode of communication – not only does
not preclude our attempt to apply Levinasian
theory to CMC; it demands that we press ahead
with this attempted linkage. Our goal, in other
words, will be to divest a theoretical model
from what may have been a limitation imposed
upon it solely on the grounds of the personal
anxieties of the individual who developed the
model. 
Face and proximity
The task will not be simple. Already, the key
terms that we have indicated we will be using
to focus our discussion of Levinas – face and
proximity – will strike some readers as repre-
senting a significant obstacle for a Levinasian
approach to CMC. Readers may be familiar
with these terms for the very reason that they
have been traditionally used in CMC studies to
define the mode of communication from which
CMC is itself to be differentiated. By definition,
CMC studies have long required that their
object is defined in binary opposition to face-
to-face (FTF) communication. All that CMC
studies presume to be fully present in FTF
communication – the simultaneous presence of
the interlocutors in close proximity, with
exposed and visible faces – is understood to be
absent from CMC. 
Fortunately, this binary opposition provides us
with the terms we require to proceed, since
even the most cursory encounter with Levinas’s
writings on the concept of face is radically at
odds with the compact definition of FTF
communication as traditionally proffered
within communications research. Thus, we can
begin by demonstrating that the concept of
face, for Levinas, resists the binary separation
of the terms CMC and FTF upon which CMC
studies is grounded. As we do this, of course,
we must also be duly cautious not to suggest
that this resistance is absolute, such that the
Levinasian concept of face might be rendered
completely irrelevant to the frames of refer-
ence according to which CMC studies operate.
Thus, it is necessary to leave sufficient room in
our demonstration for recuperation of the
traditional ground of CMC studies. To do this,
we shall carefully map several of the different
ways in which Levinas himself grappled with
the slipperiness of this concept of ‘face’, even
as we work to establish a consistent framework
that can be extrapolated out from writings that
span more than four decades. 
There are occasions in Levinas’s work on which
the term ‘face’ is described in terms that might
seem to be consistent with the compact defini-
tion of the FTF encounter. It may even be said
that Levinas seeks never to have ‘face’ wholly
divorced from the direct presentation (the
presence) of the person, appearing before me
as ‘this chaste bit of skin, with brow, eyes, nose,
and mouth’ (1987: 41). Yet neither can ‘face’
ever be wholly reduced to this surface presen-
tation. The face initially emerges in Levinas’s
work as a way to explain what is lost in
Heidegger’s ontology. In order to explain that
we do not simply encounter others in the
essence of their being, that is, in the moment
of Being-with-the-Other, Levinas asserts that
this encounter cannot translate as simply
letting the other be: ‘Is not the independence
of the other (autrui) accomplished in the role
of being summoned?  Is the one to whom one
speaks understood from the first in his being?
Not at all. The other (autrui) is not an object of
comprehension first and an interlocutor
second. The two relations are intertwined’
(1996: 6). The relations that Levinas describes in
this way amounts to the idea that it is possible
for me to gain access in some tangible way to
another human being, and this idea of access is
what he calls ‘a face’ (ibid: 8) in this early essay
on ontology. 
Later, as he began working through these ideas
in greater detail, descriptions of the face
become more complex. In Totality and Infinity,
the face is first and foremost a speaking face
but it is no mere interlocutor. Its defining
feature is now ‘expression,’ which is a primary
condition for locution per se: ‘The face, expres-
sion simpliciter, forms the first word, the face is
the signifier which appears on top of this sign,
like eyes looking at you’ (1969: 153). The shift
effected here will be crucial in what follows.
Locution or speech is not the modus operandi
of the face, but only a function of its entry into
language. To describe this function, Levinas
introduces a careful distinction between the
Saying and the Said. What Levinas calls the
Saying is a precondition for the Said (or the
content of speech understood as having
already been articulated) but the Saying is
commensurable more with this concept of
expression, which is to be understood not as a
language contained in or passing out of the
mouth; rather, it is the irreducible ‘language of
the eyes’ (ibid: 66). The shift from mouth to
eyes opens the way for a possible further move-
ment, and Levinas is forced to admit that
expression can be understood within the ethi-
cal relation ‘in the sense that implements,
clothing, and gestures express’ (ibid: 182). Later
still, in Otherwise than Being and elsewhere,
the field to which ‘face’ refers will expand
further, at once referring back to the skin as a
way to reinforce the non-verbal component of
the face’s expression, and yet refusing to give
over to an ontological standpoint by insisting
to an even greater extent on the enigmatic
non-phenomenal status of the face. The face
recedes from presence in these later works in
order to emphasize proximity, that is, the space
between the Other and the Same, although in
so doing, the face comes to represent ever
more insistently the face of a human interlocu-
tor.
The fundamental ‘alterity’ of the Other
The point is that Levinas never settled on a
programmatic definition of the term ‘face’ in
his work; rather, he continually grappled with
the issue of putting a face – so to say – to the
ethical relation. Importantly, however, from
early in his thinking Levinas was to hold firm on
a crucial aspect of this relation: the fundamen-
tal ‘alterity’ of the Other. In Totality and
Infinity, for example, Levinas had already
determined that Heidegger’s ontology fails
ultimately because it elides the ‘otherness’ of
the Other, which Levinas calls the Other’s alter-
ity. This is to say that the encounter with the
Other is not simply about difference and same-
ness, but about the fact that the relation must
by definition involve both an ‘I’ and one other. 
In this sense, the otherness of the Other is
always an otherness within a relation between
two. This fundamental principle, once estab-
lished, becomes the conceptual grounding on
which Levinas builds the whole of his ethical
framework. Alterity is nothing more nor less
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than what conjoins me to the Other as a
responsible being, since it is the presence of the
Other as another and the necessary recognition
that I am therefore one in a relation with one
other that allows me to come into knowledge
of myself. Thus, I am wholly responsible to the
Other for my being. It is in this elegant formu-
lation that Levinas found the key to the ethical
relation, and to the absolute priority of the
Other before the Same, the latter of which
pairing comes into being only as a consequence
of the alterity of the Other. 
Where Levinas seems to equivocate, it is in
trying to present this elegant formulation on
some occasions in ways that can be applied to
everyday realities and at other times in the full-
ness of the implications of this model for meta-
physics. As I have suggested with my brief
discussion of the various ways in which the
concept of ‘face’ was used throughout
Levinas’s works, this term was highly subject to
such equivocations. Yet it is clear that in all of
these various modalities by which the ‘face’ is
presented, Levinas insists that ‘face’ must ulti-
mately be seen as being that by which I come
to be aware of the alterity of the Other, and
therefore that through which I am enjoined to
respond to the Other. We have seen that in his
early work, this issue of responding to the
Other was linked to interlocution, which is why
it must have seemed necessary in that work to
conceive of this Other as human, since it is with
humans that we communicate as such. Yet we
also saw that as early as Totality and Infinity,
Levinas was prepared to concede that, in the
application of these concepts to everyday real-
ities, the face could potentially be anything
that conveys an expression. It is on this crucial
point that our discussion will now hinge.      
Admittedly, in what I cited above, Levinas
maintains that the face expressing itself is a
human face, yet the fact that this expression is
defined ‘in the sense that implements, cloth-
ing, and gestures express’ means that he is will-
ing to conceive of this face in far more general
terms, as something exterior; shall we say, as
anything associated with the surface of the
body. Face can thus be of the human but need
not be human itself, as long as it expresses
itself and enjoins one to respond. The preposi-
tion is key here: as Bernhard Waldenfels points
out, the postscript to Totality and Infinity –
‘Beyond the Face’ – should be read as inform-
ing rather than creating a movement away
from the work that precedes it. Accordingly,
we would be more inclined to take seriously
the observation that the ‘whole body’ consti-
tutes the face, ‘in order to develop a sort of
responsiveness which penetrates all our senses
and our bodily behaviour in toto’. In other
words, we should read in Levinas at this
moment the claim that face is of us totally, in
the sense of an embodied wholeness rather
than just of our uppermost visage.
As Levinas withdraws from this position in
subsequent works, he intends to develop an
ethical framework that goes beyond the
phenomenal. Yet his willingness to take the
phenomenological investigation as a starting
point must not be overlooked. What I believe is
lacking in the vast majority of work on CMC is
just this phenomenological basis. Studies of
CMC invariably proceed from the standard
communications model of sender-message-
receiver with the technology used to convey
the message given – as the name suggests – the
role of medium. Both sender and receiver are
deemed to be present only in so far as both
have access to a computer terminal, but as a
result they are both deemed to be absent from
each other. It is thus because neither interlocu-
tor is present to the other that CMC is invari-
ably described in terms of being a disembodied
or ‘virtual’ form of communication. A phenom-
enological investigation would begin, I
suggest, not by considering the failure of the
interlocutors to appear before each other but
by emphasising the minimal physical condition
on which CMC is grounded: each participant
requires access to a computer terminal. 
Grounding virtual ethics in the phenomenal
A virtual ethics must ground itself in the
phenomenal, beginning with a consideration
of the engagement between human and
computer, rather than treating the computer
as an incidental component in the recession of
the human interlocutors from one another. I
have been working on a phenomenology of
computer use for several years and while a
detailed account of this project would repre-
sent an overlong digression here, I shall affirm
that the body is far from absent from the
frames of reference. The hand guides the
mouse, caresses the touchpad, thumps the
keyboard, but the engagement extends
beyond digits and thumbs to cover the whole
of my body in that I am situated vis-à-vis a
chair, a bench, my lap, and most importantly, a
screen. All of these technologies to which I
make my body fit have evolved through vari-
ous, not always altogether interconnected,
pathways. 
When I fit myself to the spaces laid out by the
shape of the computer workspace I give myself
bodily to this current intersection of these vari-
ous technologies and their histories of design.
Once, while incapacitated, I tried to make the
workspace fit my bodily requirements. It was
not easy, working on a keyboard while prone
on a bed, even less so trying to use a mouse
without a solid, flat surface. The technology is
of course adaptable, to a degree. Witness the
very elaborate design modifications that have
been developed to enable Stephen Hawking to
defy his condition by continuing to use his
computer. Yet in recent times, as his condition
has continued to deteriorate, even Hawking
has been forced to acquiesce to the standard
design requirements of this technology by
employing an assistant to type for him. In short,
the design specifications of the computer inter-
pellate the user normatively and deviations
from the normative body are accommodated
only to a limited extent.
Now, I noted that a virtual ethics should be
grounded in such phenomenal matters. It is
important that we also push further and do not
content ourselves with mapping all the limita-
tions that workspaces place on our bodies, like
some grand workplace health and safety regi-
men. Cyborg studies have in the past decade
produced some interesting commentaries on
the plight of the body in an increasingly elec-
tronic or machinic age, yet the ethical impera-
tives coming out of these studies are typically
expressed as the concern for what happens to
human bodies in the encounter between the
human and the machine, or in the transition
from the real to the virtual space. These studies
are concerned, that is, for the status of the
human and the machine, in the extent to which
either can be said to contain the other as a
state. While frequently bemoaning the loss of
the human being in the transition to the
cyborg state, these studies already consign
both human and machine to objects. We need
to consider, as Levinas does, the entry into
language of the human through the encounter
with the machine, the coming forth of the
speaking subject rather than the settling down
of things into objective states.
How the computer presents itself to us
To do this, we shall extend the phenomenolog-
ical map of the human body fitted to the
design specifications of the computer work-
space by considering the way in which the
computer presents itself to us. Even as we learn
to use the mouse, the keyboard, or all other
associated pieces of hardware, computers are
already interpellating us in another way,
through the interface, by which I refer to the
words and images on the computer screen as
they interact with the technologies by which
we can access them, and which systematically
enjoin us to engage with a computer program
in specific ways. In the earliest days of
computer design, the programs that ran on
computers were capable of being activated
only by programmers, specialists who write
programs and understand programming
languages. In order for computers to be
rendered useful for laypersons, programmers
developed the user-interface, which interpel-
lates us as users rather than as programmers.
The interface is what appears to us on the
screen, addressing us in a language that we
understand so that we do not need to familiar-
ize ourselves with the parameters of the
programming language in order for the
program to work for us.   
While the computer workspace situates the
human body within given parameters, it is the
interface that draws forth from that body the
entry into language. The interface is, quite
simply, the movement beyond the surface of
the body – what Freudians call the skin ego –
towards an expression. It is, to be sure, the
condition for the possibility of interlocution in
CMC, which should suggest to us that the inter-
face is therefore aptly named, even in a
Levinasian sense, as the anterior of the face
which expresses itself. The interface does not
wholly preclude the appearance of the face, at
least at the level of image. Communications
researchers have established that the use of a
photographic image of the interlocutor as an
on-screen avatar does not simply reproduce a
face-to-face relation in the immediacy of what
we would consider a full presence: ‘At least
some of the time, trying to make interfaces
more like humans apparently results in discon-
certing users, if not actually confusing or
displeasing them’ (cited in Walther et al 2001:
106). The point is, of course, that the image or
representation does not substitute for a full
presence, and this is a point that Levinas makes
even about the perception of the face of the
Other as a sign. To put it bluntly, the interface
functions better in enjoining us to enter into
language, to express ourselves, and to respond
if it remains unadorned with a hollow mask.
This is its enigmatic crux: the interface must not
present itself as a representation of a face. 
Jeffrey Hancock and Philip Dunham (2001)
have shown that people engaged in FTF inter-
actions tended to have more detailed impres-
sions about their interlocutor, but the partici-
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pants in CMC tended to make more intense and
enduring impressions. The face of the other, it
seems, when it appears before us in the space
we normally reserve only for the inter-face,
might actually militate against the kind of
affinity that we would expect as a precondition
for the ethical relation. I suggest that the
increase in intensity of impression-formation in
the CMC environment is associated with the
concept of disinhibition, which I discussed at
the start of this paper. I suggest in turn that
what the social researchers call disinhibition is a
residue of the bodily connection we have with
the technology that facilitates this mode of
communication. As we give ourselves over to
the machine, the line between our exterior
surface and the computer becomes blurred,
and this relation is exacerbated by the interpel-
lation of the user through the interface. We
disinhibit, so to speak, because we wholly
inhabit the site of computer use, hardware and
text, and this point alone must lead us to
consider the usefulness of a Levinasian frame-
work in examining the ethical relation of
communication between two computer users.
We arrive at a point, then, from which we
might begin to outline the lineaments of an
ethical framework for CMC studies, modelled
on the work of Levinas. We have seen that of
the likely obstacles to such a framework, the
most insistent would seem to be the conven-
tional distinction between CMC and FTF
communication, since Levinasian theory situ-
ates the ethical relation wholly within the face
to face encounter. Yet I have argued that the
interface through which the computer user
engages in CMC might be a locus for the
thought of the ‘face’ in a Levinasian sense
within CMC environments. In developing an
ethical framework for CMC, then, I am suggest-
ing that the conceptual status given by Levinas
to ‘face’ should be attributed to the interface.
This suggestion does require one further obser-
vation to be made here, namely, a comment
regarding the capacity for something like a
thought of a face-interface relation to accom-
modate the anteriority of the Other in a forma-
tion characterized principally by alterity. There
is a possibility in what we have been describing
to suggest that the phenomenology of
computer use indicates a direct relation
between user and computer, such that there is
a coming together of human and technology.
In this scenario, we fail to describe one being in
a relation with one other, which is required in
the ethical relation as Levinas describes it;
rather, we merely bear witness to the emer-
gence of the cyborg. Yet what I hope to have
shown in this paper is that the interface is no
mere extension of a body fitted to a work-
space. The interface calls the subject forth in
the entry into language, and in this regard the
interface generates a necessarily proximal rela-
tion, a projection of an exterior beyond the
immediate contact between the body and its
technological accoutrements. 
In a paper in The International Journal of
Critical Psychology (2002), several years ago, I
examined the idea of embodiment as the very
projection of a sense of an interior and an exte-
rior of the self understood as a whole body,
and it is this kind of thinking that underlines
the present observations. Along these lines, the
relation between the body and the technology
of CMC is envisaged as the projection of a
surface and an exterior, yet it is the bringing
forth of myself as a speaking subject, which the
interface enjoins me to be, that takes CMC into
the realm of ethics. In bringing my self forth,
beyond the surface projected as my exterior
limit, the interface occasions the creation of
the responsible ‘I’ and the other, which Levinas
posits as the minimal precursors to the estab-
lishment of ethical freedom. If such an ethical
framework is indeed possible in studies of
CMC, then, what kind of shape would it take?
As the previous comments suggest, a virtual
ethics modelled on Levinas would be a strange
hybrid – that is to say, it should be a strange
hybrid: its origins must be located in the
phenomenology of any CMC technology but it
must also proceed further, taking in fields of
knowledge that allow us to account for the
intersubjective relation. This intersubjectivity is
not, moreover, only to be reduced to the level
of the communicative act between user and
user, but must incorporate the role of the
interface as interlocutor or, perhaps, as what
Levinas himself described as ‘expression
simpliciter’ in the very condition of making
interlocution possible.
The necessary hybridity of such a study could,
indeed, be precisely its most valuable asset in
opening out the field of CMC studies to a
range of contiguous disciplinary fields that are
already producing interesting material under
the rubric of Cyber Studies in more general
terms. The studies currently being undertaken
by communications researchers, for example,
provide a wealth of useful primary data, but as
I indicated already, the step toward an ethically
inflected study of CMC requires the movement
from phenomenology to an account of inter-
subjectivity. The common denominator in any
study that proceeds along these lines will,
therefore, be a phenomenology of the technol-
ogy in question. It is not sufficient to simply
talk of the ‘computer’ in CMC as a constant,
since the only constant is that technologies
associated with computing are continually in
transformation. Thus, it is essential that any
study of CMC will account for the technology
on offer at that moment. Phenomenologists
may talk of essences in ways that strike a
layperson as being a quality of an object
outside of history, but as the object changes,
then so too does the locus of the phenomeno-
logical investigation. To put this more simply, it
does indeed matter whether I am working a
mouse and a keyboard or using voice recogni-
tion software, or whether I am communicating
via a text based messenger system or a fully
developed synthetic world like Second Life. A
phenomenology will drill down to this level of
detail if it is to have any purchase on the
specific CMC environment to which it refers.
An ethical framework for CMC studies
The scope and method of an ethical framework
for CMC studies will then be open to more
expansive concerns, and I would be chary here
to attempt to be too prescriptive about the
precise forms that such studies might take. My
own thinking about these matters has been
informed by disciplines such as anthropology
(Abbinett; Trend) and psychology (Joinson;
Kuntze et al; Preston; Wallace), but there are
doubtless others that can usefully be engaged
in the task of unpacking intersubjectivity
within a CMC environment. By retaining the
phenomenological investigation as a precursor
to these other fields of inquiry, we avoid the
risk of presuming that the intersubjective rela-
tion inheres only in the figures of two humans. 
By enabling the interface to be imagined as
possessing the hallmarks of a subject-position –
just as I have been arguing the user is invariably
led to do in the process of entering into CMC as
a communicative rather than simply a comput-
ing act – then we enrich the potential for the
human sciences to give an account of what
happens to the individual when he or she faces
a computer in order to communicate. The value
of such an exercise, on an ongoing basis, will be
that it reinforces the responsibility that a user
should assume as an integral part of any act
that involves at least one other. This is to say
that a study of CMC that proceeds from
phenomenological inquiry to a further investi-
gation of the impact of the phenomena on the
interlocutor will, by definition, contain the
rudiments of an ethical framework. 
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